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Interns or Workers? China’s Student Labor Regime
Jenny Chan, Pun Ngai, Mark Selden
Abstract
In  the  summer  of  2010,  Taiwanese-based
Foxconn Technology Group-the world's largest
electronics  manufacturer-utilized the labor  of
150,000  student  interns  from  vocational
schools at its facilities all over China. Foxconn
is one of  many global  firms utilizing student
intern  labor.  Far  from  being  freely  chosen,
student internships are organized by the local
state  working  with  enterprises  and  schools,
frequently in violation of the rights of student
interns  and  in  violation  of  Chinese  law.
Foxconn, through direct deals with government
departments,  has  outsourced  recruitment  to
vocational schools to obtain a new source of
student workers at below minimum wages. The
goals and timing of internships are set not by
student educational or training priorities but by
the  demand  for  products  dictated  by
companies. Based on fieldwork in Sichuan and
Guangdong between 2011 and 2012 and follow-
up interviews in 2014, as well as analysis of the
Henan government's policies on internships, we
find that the student labor regime has become
integral  to  the capital-state relationship as a
means to assure a lower cost and flexible labor
supply  for  Foxconn  and  others.  This  is  one
dimension  of  the  emerging  face  of  Chinese
state capitalism.
Keywords
student  labor,  state  capitalism,  internship,
vocational  school,  Foxconn  Technology  Group
I. Introduction
"My original plan was to seek an internship at
Huawei  Technologies,  but  our  teacher
persuaded my whole  class  of  42 students  to
intern  at  Foxconn  Technology  Group,"  a
student from a vocational school in Sichuan's
Mianyang city  recalled.  Under pressure from
the Sichuan government to fulfill  a quota for
interns at Foxconn in 2010, the teacher was
directed to recruit entire classes and overcome
student  objections  to  taking  Foxconn
internships. "During the night shift, whenever I
look out in that direction [pointing to the west],
I see the big fluorescent sign of Huawei shining
bright red, and at that moment, I feel a pain in
my heart," she said before sinking into a long
silence.  Huawei  (founded  in  Shenzhen  as  a
private-sector  firm  in  1987)  and  Foxconn
(founded in Taipei in 1974 and incorporated in
Shenzhen as a  Taiwanese-invested enterprise
in 1988) have headquarters on opposite sides of
the  Meiguan  Expressway  in  Longhua  Town,
Shenzhen City. Although neither the intern nor
we can verify whether the internship program
offered by Huawei would have been any better
than  that  at  Foxconn,  she  regretted  her
inability  to  choose  her  internship  site
(Fieldwork  in  Shenzhen  City,  Guangdong
Province,  April  2011).
Who are the interns? How are they recruited
and managed at the workplace? In this article
we show the processes by which companies,
vocational  schools,  and  local  governments
jointly  carry  out  "internship  programs"  that
turn large numbers  of  teenage students  into
factory  workers.  We  attempt  to  explain  the
emergence of this student labor regime in the
context of China's rising manufacturing costs
and intensified competition among companies
for employees in global production. Analyzing
the organization of student internships, we look
into the pivotal role of transnational capital and
its ability to secure privileged access to labor in
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negotiation with the Chinese state. The active
cooperation  of  provincial  and  lower  level
governments  in  circumventing  labor  law
restrictions, and ensuring corporate access to a
lower cost and flexible supply of student labor
(xueshenggong 學生工), is fundamental to the
contemporary Chinese labor regime.
Our  primary  research  is  based  on  multiple
fieldtrips  to  Foxconn's  largest  assembly
facilities  in  Sichuan  (Chengdu  City)  and
Guangdong (Shenzhen City) between 2011 and
2012,  and  follow-up  visits  in  Shenzhen  in
August  2014,  supplemented  with  inquiries
made to  senior  company executives  between
December 2013 and April  2014.1  Drawing on
interviews  with  38  interns  and  14  teachers,
who  were  dispatched  from  eight  vocational
schools  (based  in  Sichuan  and  Henan
provinces) to Foxconn factories for internships,
we also conducted documentary analysis of the
Henan government's major policies on student
internships and employment.  There has been
scant scholarly attention to student interns as
temporary  or  contingent  labor,  leaving
unexamined  an  important  dimension  of  the
precarity of Chinese labor that is the product of
the triangular relationship linking capital, the
local state, and vocational schools in internship
programs.  In  the  following  we  review  the
changing  labor  market  and  ongoing  legal
reforms and structural transformation in China.
We then present the findings of our study of the
Foxconn internship program, and conclude by
assessing  the  corporate  and  government
responses  to  student  labor  abuses.
The majority of Foxconn's more than one million
workers are rural migrants and teenage student
interns. Fushikang, headquartered in Taipei
(registered as Hon Hai Precision Industry Company),
literally means "wealthy" and "healthy" in Chinese.
Photographs taken during field trips to Guangdong
and Sichuan (2011-2014).
 
II. Student Labor in China
The  re-emergence  of  labor  markets  under
China's  reforms  since  the  late  1970s  has
transformed the economy in step with Chinese
and  international  investment  and  the
privatization  of  numerous  state  enterprises.
Employment  in  the  manufacturing  sector
(relative  to  agriculture  and  the  service
industry) reached an unprecedented 15 percent
of  the  economically  active  population  in  the
mid-1990s.  The percentage would  have been
even higher if the other eight to 14 percent of
those  employed  in  uncategorized  industries
were added (Evans and Staveteig  2009,  78).
The increase in industrial workers was mainly
drawn from the hundreds of millions of rural
m i g r a n t s  wh o ,  i n  t h e  w a k e  o f  d e -
collectivization,  were  absorbed  into  booming
township  and village  enterprises  and export-
oriented privately-owned factories, along with
state and collective enterprises. However, the
labor  rights  and  interests  of  many  internal
migrants  were  unprotected.  It  was  not  until
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July 1994, following tragic industrial fires and
deaths  and  numerous  abuses,  that  the
government  promulgated  a  Labor  Law  to
regulate  the  complex  labor  relations  of  the
market economy (Gallagher 2005, 2014; Ngok
2008;  Liebman  2014).  The  law  guarantees
basic  protections  to  all  worker-citizens,
regardless of household registration status or
ownership  type,  such  as  entitlement  to
employment contracts,  local  minimum wages,
overtime  premiums,  social  insurance  and
retirement benefits, rest days, safe and healthy
workplaces,  and  access  to  government-
sponsored  labor  d ispute  reso lut ion
mechanisms.  Despite  the  national  labor
compliance  requirements,  employers
systematically "ignored the law with impunity
because of the lack of effective implementation
and  enforcement  by  local  regulatory  or
supervisory organizations, including the trade
union, the local labor bureau and the courts"
(Gallagher and Dong 2011, 44).
When  structural  reforms  and  privatization
accelerated in the 1990s and following China's
accession to the World Trade Organization in
2001,  many  small  and  medium  state-owned
enterprises  lost  out  in  the  f ierce  new
competition. Laid-off workers, especially those
who were relatively young, joined the rank and
file  of  rural  migrants  to  toil  in  the  "world
factory," facing great uncertainties in a more
liberalized  economy  (Solinger  2009;  Blecher
2010; Andreas 2012; Hurst 2009, 2015). As of
2005,  Chinese  manufacturing  wages  as  a
percentage of US wages, compared to those of
Japan and East Asian Tigers like South Korea
and Taiwan in the early years of their economic
takeoffs, had remained consistently low (Hung
2008, fig. 1, 2009, fig. 5). Private companies as
well  as  restructured  state  enterprises  have
generally  offered  fixed-term  employment
contracts,  effectively  ending  a  lifetime  "iron
rice bowl" tenure that had been prevalent in
large urban state enterprises. Other employing
units,  however,  failed  to  provide  labor
contracts, minimum statutory wages, or welfare
benefits,  generating  worker  grievances  and
resistance (Chan 2001; Pringle 2011; Elfstrom
and Kuruvilla 2014; Zipp and Blecher 2015). In
the  face  of  increasing  worker  lawsuits  and
collective  protests  since  the  mid-1990s,  the
Chinese government was compelled to expand
legal  reforms to ensure minimally acceptable
social  and  labor  standards  as  a  means  to
alleviate  the  growing  tensions  between
legitimacy and profitability (Lee 2007; Lee and
Zhang 2013; Chen 2012; Friedman 2014).2
From the  mid-2000s,  as  a  result  of  growing
worker  demands  for  better  conditions,
tightening labor markets due to demographic
changes, and Beijing government measures to
stimulate  domestic  consumption  such  as
boosting  statutory  minimum  wages  and
abolishing agricultural taxes, wages have been
rising (Chu and So 2010; Eggleston et al. 2013;
Davis  2014;  Whyte  2014;  Naughton  2014).
Firms were increasingly pressured to cut costs
and  to  cope  with  fluctuations  in  production
orders by hiring temporary workers, including
student  interns  (also  termed  student
apprentices or  trainees)  and agency laborers
(also known as dispatched workers, who signed
contracts  directly  with  privately-run  or
government-operated  agencies  but  providing
services  to  client  companies).  In  the  seven
large  state-owned  and  Sino-foreign  joint-
ventured  automobile  assembly  factories  that
she surveyed, Lu Zhang (2015) found that the
number of temporary workers ranged from one-
to  two-thirds  of  the  total  workforce  during
fieldwork in the mid-to-late 2000s. Downward
cost  pressure  in  business  competition,
particularly  during  the  2008  global  financial
crisis, eroded the wages and benefits as well as
job security of regular workers who have not
yet been displaced by temporary laborers. The
latter's per capita cost averages only one-fourth
to one-third of the former's (Park and Cai 2011,
33-35; Zhou 2013, 362-63). Unequal treatment
of  the  temporary  and  regular  workers
performing identical production tasks created a
two-tiered  employment  system.  This  system
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engendered  worker  conflicts  and  social
divisions. As Eli Friedman and Ching Kwan Lee
(2010, 513) insightfully observe, this dual labor
regime  "is  problematic  not  just  from  the
perspective of the informal workers, but also
from [that  of]  the regular  workers,  who will
find it increasingly difficult to make collective
demands on their employers."
Agency workers, who were long excluded from
national  legal  protection  prior  to  the
implementation  of  the  significant  Labor
Contract  Law on 1  January  2008,  eventually
gained access to  basic  employment rights,  if
only honored on the books. Under the new law,
under which hiring agencies and client firms
share  joint  legal  responsibilities,  agency
workers are supposed to receive the same pay
for doing the same work as directly employed
workers. Moreover, they are assumed to take
only  "temporary,  auxiliary,  and  substitute"
posts,  thereby  placing  certain  limits  on
informalization  while  maintaining  labor  and
organizational  flexibility  (Chan  2009;  Harper
Ho 2009; Wang et al.  2009; Cui et al.  2013;
Gallagher et al. 2015; Zhang 2015, chap. 7). It
is important to note, however, that the 2008
law did not cover interning students. Interns,
who are not, after all classified as workers, can
be laid off without severance pay and 30 days'
prior notice to which employees are entitled.
They  continue  to  possess  fewer  legal  rights
than agency or regular workers even when they
are directly recruited and assigned to the same
tasks  (Pun and Chan 2012,  2013;  Chan and
Selden 2014; Pun et al. 2014; Chan et al. 2013,
2015).
The  vulnerability  of  interns  as  laborers,
including both those who are unpaid and those
who  are  under-paid,  has  recently  drawn
discussion  centering  on  the  applicability  of
relevant national and international laws. Earl
Brown  and  Kyle  deCant  (2014),  in  their
provocative essay "Exploiting Chinese Interns
as Unprotected Industrial Labor," ask whether
interns-who  are  not  legally  defined  as
employees under Chinese law-are in practice
provided  equal  labor  rights  at  work,  and
whether the internship experience benefits the
intern. The controversy is not just about poor
management and lack of educational content in
some internship programs, as documented in
the 2010 OECD (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development) review report on
China's  development  of  vocational  education
and  workplace-based  internship  training
(Kuczera and Field 2010, 18-27). It is ultimately
about  the  well-being  of,  and  fundamental
fairness to, student intern workers. While the
Chinese state has not fully recognized interns
as workers, it has granted them certain rights
under  the  domestic  legal  framework.  Brown
and  deCant  (2014,  195)  compellingly  assert:
"When  these  programs  [at  Foxconn,  Honda,
and  other  workplaces]  are  devoid  of  any
relevant  educational  component  and
maintained  solely  for  the  benefit  of  the
employer's bottom line, these interns should be
afforded  the  full  protection  of  China's  labor
laws." We aim to extend the legalistic debates
by evaluating the role of the local state as a
direct agent in a capitalist development process
in which student labor governance is becoming
an integral and substantive part. As we will see,
at stake is not a mere legal technicality; it is
the dynamism of  a  capital-state alliance that
charts the role of student labor with important
implications  both  for  student  (mis)education
and the corporate bottom line.
From  the  national  to  the  global  level,  the
promulgation  of  a  set  of  non-binding
transnational  labor  and  environmental
standards has been among the key corporate
responses  to  sweatshop  charges  made  by
workers and their supporters in many countries
(Ross 2004; Smith et al. 2006; Litzinger 2013;
Locke 2013; Lüthje et al. 2013; Ruggie 2013).
Workers-including  student  interns-are
subjected to the pressure of buyers in multi-
layered production networks. Image-conscious
companies,  in  response  to  charges  of  labor
abuse in factories that produce their products,
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pledge  to  adhere  to  good  labor  practices  in
global production, such as respecting the rights
of  "student  workers"  in  China  (Electronic
Industry Citizenship Coalition [EICC] 2014, 44).
Electronic  Industry  Citizenship  Coalition
(EICC),  the  membership-based  industry
association  representing  Apple  and  Foxconn
and 100-plus other companies worldwide, has
asserted that, "In the past 10 years we have
seen  that  consistent  auditing,  clearer
guidelines, greater transparency and a Code of
Conduct can play important roles" in regulating
"student  working  hours,  wages,  [and]  health
and safety  gaps"  (EICC 2015,  4).  In  China's
high-tech  electronics  manufacturing,
researchers  including  ourselves  have  just
begun to assess the impact of corporate codes
of conduct on workers' conditions.
In a nutshell,  we locate student labor at the
heart of key industries, notably electronics, in
globalized China. In contrast to the approach of
Lu  Zhang  in  Inside  China's  Automobile
Factories  (2015,  chaps.  5-6),  who  did  not
distinguish  between  interning  students  and
agency  workers  in  her  categorization  of
"temporary  workers,"  a  group  contrasted  to
"formal  workers,"  we  aim to  understand  the
distinctive  character  of  student  interns  in
China's  international  political  economy.
Accordingly,  we  examine  the  central  role  of
three parties in the recruitment and control of
students during the internship period, namely,
factory  managers,  school  teachers,  and  local
officials.  Our  major  goal  is  to  explain  the
systemic  deployment  of  student  interns  in
industrial  production  through  a  study  of
Foxconn's  practice,  thereby  contributing  to
deeper  understanding  of  the  massive  use  of
student  interns  on  worker  fragmentation
among  Chinese  workers.
III. The Foxconn Internship Program
With  more  than  one  million  employees,
Foxconn  is  the  world's  largest  industrial
employer  (DeCarlo  2014)  and  probably
maintains  the  world's  largest  internship
program.  The  Foxconn  internship  program,
which brought in as many as 150,000 young
students during the peak production months in
summer 2010-approximately 15 percent of the
company's  workforce  (Foxconn  Technology
Group 2010a)-and which continues to hire new
interns  across  China  at  present,  dwarfs
Disney's College Program, which received more
than 50,000 interns cumulatively over 30 years
from college partners in the United States and
abroad  (Perlin  2011,  6).  How is  the  capital-
state-school  coalition  behind  the  Foxconn
internship  program  organized?
Foxconn is a key node in the Asian and global
production networks, where the processing of
components,  final  assembly,  and shipment of
finished products to world consumers continues
around the clock 24 hours a day, 365 days a
year.  Inside  Foxconn there  are  more  than a
dozen  "business  groups"  (shiyequn  事業群),
which  compete  on  speed,  quality,  efficiency,
engineering  services,  and  added  value  to
maximize  profits.  In  one  of  these  business
groups,  iDPBG  (integrated  Digital  Product
Business  Group),  which  produces  exclusively
for  Apple,  28,044  student  interns  worked
alongside workers in Shenzhen in 2010-a six-
fold increase from 4,539 in 2007. They were
recruited  from  "more  than  200  secondary
vocational schools" (Foxconn Technology Group
2010b,  23).  At  the  company's  30-plus
manufacturing  mega-complexes  across  China
(see Figure 1), workers and student interns toil
day and night to churn out iPhones, iPads, and
other electronic products for Apple and other
IT corporations. Following Chinese government
stimulus-led growth and economic recovery, as
well as large-volume orders, in 2010, Foxconn
registered a 53 percent year-on-year increase
in revenues to US$95 billion (3 trillion NTD)
(Foxconn Technology Group 2011, 4). Student
interns,  among assembly-line workers,  played
an indispensable role in corporate expansion.
 APJ | JF 13 | 36 | 2
6
Foxconn locations in greater China, 1974-2015.
Foxconn has more than 30 factories across China. In
many cities, Foxconn runs multiple manufacturing
facilities. Sources: Foxconn Technology Group
company websites and annual reports.
 
China  has  more  than  13,300  registered
vocational schools and colleges (Xinhua 2015).
In  2014,  approximately  18  million  full-time
students were enrolled in secondary vocational
schools  across  the  country.  The  government
projects  an  increase  in  vocational  school
enrollment  to  23.5  million  by  2020  (not
including those in vocational colleges or adult
vocational education) (Ministry of Education of
the People's Republic of China 2010a, table 1).
Upon  completing  nine  years  of  compulsory
education,  students  can compete to  continue
their studies in general track high schools or
enroll  in  vocational  institutions.  The  age  of
admission  to  standard  three-year  vocational
schools is often as young as 15. While students
in  high  schools  are  prepared  for  university
entrance,  those  in  vocational  schools  are
trained for  skilled work or  higher  vocational
education.
Vocational  schools  offer  employment-oriented
courses  for  first-  and  second-year  students.
During their third year, when they are 17 to 18
years old, students are expected to intern at
enterprises that are "directly relevant to their
studies" (Ministries of Education and Finance
of the People's Republic of China 2007, art. 3).
However, our interviews revealed that Foxconn
not only recruits students regardless of their
field of study, but also often much earlier than
is  legally  allowed (that  is,  in  their  first  and
second  years  of  vocational  studies).  In  our
sample,  only  eight  of  the 38 student  interns
were in their final year. Their average age was
16.5,  just  above  the  national  statutory
minimum  working  age  of  16.
The Working Conditions of Student Interns
The  duration  of  the  Foxconn  internship
programs we studied during fieldwork in 2011
and 2012  ranged  from three  months  to  one
year. From the beginning of her internship, Liu
Siying3,  the  final-year  student  aspiring  to  a
meaningful learning opportunity whom we met
at the opening of this article, was "tied to the
PCB  [printed  circuit  board]  line  attaching
components to the product back-casing." In her
words,  " i t  required  no  ski l ls  or  prior
knowledge." Students were assigned to a one-
size-fits-all  internship  at  Foxconn  factories,
which  involved  repetitive  manual  labor
divorced  from  their  studies  and  interests.
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Foxconn  Chengdu's  newly  built  18-story  factory
dormitory,  Block  2.  Teachers  are  housed  in  dorm
rooms next to their students to strengthen control
during  the  off-work  hours  throughout  the
"internship."
Sichuan  Zhongjiang  Vocational  School  students,
many of them 16 years of age, arrived at Foxconn
(Chengdu) in the morning on 3 March 2011 to begin
"internships."
 
China's leaders seek to boost labor productivity
through expanded investment in vocational skill
training (Woronov 2011; Hansen and Woronov
2013;  Ling  2015).  At  Foxconn,  interns  were
placed on assembly lines to work illegally long
shifts of ten to 12 hours, six to seven days a
week.  Article  5  of  the  2007  Administrative
Measures  for  Internships  at  Secondary
Vocational Schools (Ministries of Education and
Finance of the People's Republic of China 2007)
states that "interns shall not work more than
eight  hours  a  day,"  and the  2010 Education
Circular (Clause 4) specifies that "interns shall
not  work  overtime  beyond  the  eight-hour
workday" (Ministry of Education of the People's
Republic  of  China  2010b).  Not  only  must
interns' shifts be no more than eight hours, all
their training activity is required to take place
during daytime to ensure students' safety and
physical and mental health, in line with the Law
of  the  People's  Republic  of  China  on  the
Protection of Minors (2013).4 In reality, interns
ranging in age from 16 to 18 were subjected to
the  same  working  conditions  as  regular
workers,  including alternating  day  and night
shifts and extensive overtime, defying the letter
and the spirit of the education law.
A typical comment by interns, their hopes for
gaining  technical  knowledge  dashed,
underlines the harsh reality of life on the line:
"We're  sent  to  do  trivial  tasks  like  checking
iPad screens and cleaning the product surface
...  we're  frustrated  at  repeating  the  same
boring work all day" (Interviews on 19 March
2011;  18  December  2011).  Foxconn  Global
Social  and  Environmental  Responsibility
Committee Executive  Director,  Martin  Hsing,
has defended the internship program, saying
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that "it meets the needs and expectations of the
interns,"  even when the educational  value of
internship  is  reduced  to  assembly-line  labor,
pure and simple.  He emphasized that  school
participation is "voluntary" and that interns are
"free to terminate their internship at any time;"
more  importantly,  the  company has  "specific
policies to ensure that [the internship program]
is implemented in full accordance with China
law" and its "own Code of Conduct" (Foxconn
Technology Group 2013). Several students told
us that they phoned their parents after the first
week of the internship asking them to pressure
Foxconn managers to immediately "release the
interns." They failed. They were told that they
"risked  not  being  able  to  graduate"  if  they
refused internships at Foxconn (Interviews on 3
March 2011; 1 April 2011; 20 January 2012).
At  Foxconn,  student  interns  are  paid.  As  of
January 2011, while student interns and entry-
level workers had the same starting wage of
950 yuan/month (USD $154 / GBP £100 / EUR
€128),  only  employees  could  receive  a  skill
bonus of 400 yuan/month (USD $65 / GBP £43 /
EUR €54).  Interns were not  entitled to have
their skills assessed in order to qualify for the
bonus  (see  Figure  2).  China's  Vocational
Education  Law,  effective  1  September  1996,
states that students participating in vocational
education programs "shall be paid properly for
their  work"  (Article  37,  shidang  de  laodong
baochou  適當的勞動報酬 )  (Ministry  of
Education  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China
1996).  Similarly,  the  2007  Administrative
Measures  for  Internships  at  Secondary
Vocational  Schools  stipulate  that  employers
should "pay reasonably for the labor of interns"
(Article 8, heli de shixi baochou 合理的實習報
酬).  Maintaining that student interns are not
employees-even  when  they  perform  work
identical to that of production workers-Foxconn
does  not  enroll  interns  in  government-
administered  social  security,  which  covers
medical  insurance,  work  injury  insurance,
unemployment  benefits,  maternity  insurance,
and  old  age  pensions,  nor  in  a  housing
provident fund (known collectively as "wu xian
yi  jin" 五險一金).  By  dispensing  with  all  of
these benefits, the company saves money.
For  the period of  our  investigation,  Foxconn
claimed to have provided "work-related injury
and health insurance" for all interns (quoted in
Fair  Labor  Association  2012,  10),  but  our
interviewed interns said they had received no
information about an insurance policy. A quick
look  at  the  math  reveals  that,  in  2015,
assuming  a  total  of  150,000  student  interns
working  in  various  Foxconn  factories  during
one month in the peak season, the savings from
not  providing  them  with  welfare  benefits  is
roughly  150,000  persons  ×  300  yuan  =
45,000,000  yuan  (economic  conditions  and
statutory  minimum  wages  vary  substantially
across  China;  we  use  the  lower  end  of  300
yuan/month  per  person for  this  illustration5).
While this is a simplified exercise, it conveys a
good sense of  employer savings for  just  one
month; considering that many interns work for
a  full  year,  the  annual  savings  must  be  far
greater.
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Foxconn  (Chengdu)  job  ad,  2011.  The
advertisement makes clear the company's
savings in employing student interns who
are ineligible for the 400 yuan per month
wage hike after three months. It does not
disclose  other  savings  such as  payments
toward  pensions.  Source:  Foxconn
Technology  Group.
Cost  cutting  is  especially  imperative  in
electronic manufacturing where profit margins
are  thin  (Kraemer  et  al.  2011;  Lüthje  et  al.
2013). In recent years, state minimum wages
have  steadily  increased  and  companies  have
faced  pressure  to  raise  wages  to  retain
workers,  particularly  a  young  cohort,  who
frequently changed jobs in an attempt to get
better  pay  and  benefits.  National  Bureau  of
Statistics  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China
(2014,  fig.  1)  reported  that  average  total
income  of  rural  migrant  workers  had  risen
steadily  following  the  economic  recovery  in
2009,  reaching  unprecedented  2,609
yuan/month in 2013, a 13.9 percent increase
from the previous year. However, "speed, not
just cost," might be "the killer attribute" that
gives Foxconn and other large manufacturers
"the  winning  edge  to  remain  competitive"
(Dinges  2012).  Pressure  from  brand-name
buyers to stay responsive to consumer demand
is strong (Hamilton et al. 2011). Accordingly,
Foxconn  translates  production  requirements
for  fast  time-to-market  and high  quality  into
increased work pressure and longer hours. In a
rare reference to the production pressures that
Apple  and  its  competitors  apply,  Foxconn
CEO's Special  Assistant  Louis  Woo explained
his  company's  perspective on overtime in an
Apri l  2012  American  media  program
(Marketplace  2012):
The  overtime  problem-when  a
company like Apple or Dell needs
to  ramp  up  production  by  20
percent for a new product launch,
Foxconn  has  two  choices:  hire
more workers or give the workers
you  already  have  more  hours.
When  demand  is  very  high,  it's
very difficult  to suddenly hire 20
percent  more  people.  Especially
when you have a million workers-
that  would  mean  hiring  200,000
people at once.
Woo's  statement  indicates  that,  when  faced
with  soaring  demand  from  Apple,  Dell,  and
other  electronics  brands,  Foxconn's  first
response is to impose compulsory overtime on
its existing labor force. However, it also tries to
hire  more  people  to  respond  seamlessly  to
corporate  demands  for  rush  orders .
Recruitment through vocational schools is  an
efficient way to pick up tens of thousands of
new  workers  at  once,  who  are  purportedly
hired in the name of skills training and school-
business cooperation (xiaoqi hezuo 校企合作).
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In  Shenzhen's  Longhua  Cultural  Square,
student intern Zhang Lintong, 16, talked about
school life and music. He told us he admires the
19th  century  Russian  realist  artist  Ilya  Repin
and praised The Song of the Volga Boatmen,
which reminds him of Repin's seminal painting
Barge Haulers  on the Volga.6  Barge Haulers
depicts  a  foreman  and  ten  laboring  men
hauling an enormous barge upstream on the
Volga. The men seem on the verge of collapse
from exhaustion.  The  lead  hauler's  eyes  are
fixed on the horizon. The second man bows his
head into his chest and the last one drifts off
from the line, a dead man walking. The haulers,
dressed in rags, are tightly bound with leather
straps. The exception is the brightly clad youth
in the center of the group, who raises his head
while fighting against his leather bonds in an
effort to free himself from toil. "I often dream,
but  repeatedly  tear  apart  my dreams;  like  a
miserable  painter,  tearing  up  my  draft
sketches…I'm  not  interested  in  assembling
iPhone parts. It's exhausting and boring. I want
to quit. But I can't," Lintong sighed (Interview
on 29 November 2011).
All 14 female and male teachers we interviewed
were aware that the Foxconn program violated
the purpose of internships, which are mandated
to  provide  an  integral  part  of  students'
education  and  skills  training.  Fearing
punishment from the school, however, teachers
and students played their parts in the charade
called  internship.  The  teachers  reported  for
duty  at  the  company  administrative  building
from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday to Friday. They
were  housed  in  the  factory  dormitories
throughout  the  internship.  Only  one  teacher
expressed criticisms of the internship system in
the  course  of  our  fieldwork.  Mr.  Tian,  a
Sichuanese in his 40s, was a Chinese literature
teacher  with  more  than  two  decades  of
teaching experience. "My daughter is 17 years
old, my only daughter. She's now preparing for
the national college entrance exam. No matter
what  the  result  is,  I  won't  let  her  come  to
intern, or work, for this company." And yet he
told us that "paid internships at Foxconn were
one  of  the  main  attractions  for  students
attending  his  school."  He  also  admitted,
however,  that  "at  Foxconn,  there's  no  real
learning through integration of classroom and
workshop.  The  distortion  of  vocational
education  in  today's  China  is  deeply  rooted"
(Interview on 16 December 2011).
Student  Internship  Recruitment  through
Government and School Mobilization
50-seater public buses line up for Foxconn (Chengdu)
in Pi County, Sichuan. Drivers provide transportation
service to Foxconn at government discounted rates.
Government-printed  banners  on  the  sides  of  the
buses  read,  "Use  fighting  spirit  to  overcome
earthquakes  and  natural  disasters  to  provide
transportation  for  Foxconn."
Foxconn,  given  its  powerful  market  position,
gains  access  to  numerous  resources  with
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strong government support all over China. In
the years since the magnitude 7.9 earthquake
that struck Sichuan in May 2008, killing 87,150
people  and  leaving  4,800,000  homeless,  the
provincial government has redoubled efforts to
attract  investments  to  fund  reconstruction.
Zhuang Hongren,  Foxconn's  chief  investment
officer, pledged to "help Chengdu to become an
unshakeable city" in world electronics (quoted
in  Sichuan  Provincial  People's  Government
2011).  In  response,  local  officials  subsidized
transportation services and provided numerous
benefits for the company. Foxconn employees
now commute to work in public buses that have
been dedicated to the exclusive use of Foxconn
(Fieldwork in Pi County, Chengdu City, March
2011).  Government-printed  banners  on  the
sides  of  the  buses  read,  "Use  fighting  spirit
against  earthquakes  and natural  disasters  to
provide  transportation  for  Foxconn"  (yong
kangzhen  jiuzai  de  jingshen,  nuli  wancheng
Fushikang baoche yewu 用抗震救災的精神，努
力完成富士康包車業務).  Foxconn's  economic
influence has become so great that CEO Terry
Gou is  widely  known among workers  as  the
"Mayor  of  'Foxconn  City'"  in  Chengdu,
provincial capital of Sichuan, southwest China.
Manager Zhu, a 31-year-old college graduate,
joined  the  human  resources  department  of
Foxconn Chengdu on its  opening in  October
2010 after seven years in a small state-owned
factory,  was  chiefly  responsible  for  liaison
linking  government,  vocational  schools,  and
Foxconn.  He  explained  (Interview  on  14
December  2011):
Over the past year, I held monthly
meetings with government leaders
responsible for the "Number One
Project"  [yihao gongcheng 一號工
程]  tailored  for  Foxconn.  Over  a
few drinks and shared cigarettes,
ou r  c o l l e ague s  and  l o c a l
government  officials  regularly
updated  each  o ther  on  the
company's  recruitment  schedules,
thereby  establishing  a  good
working  relationship.
The Sichuan provincial government prioritized
helping Foxconn as its "Number One Project."
It offered Foxconn partial funding to construct
its  gigantic  production  complex  and 18-story
dormitories.  In  addition  to  the  construction
projects,  it  undertook large-scale recruitment
of student interns and workers at new Foxconn
factories (there are two mega production sites
of Foxconn Chengdu), leaving other Taiwanese
manufacturing  competitors  such  as  Wistron
and Compal  far  behind (Global  Times  2012).
Local  education  bureaus  pitched  in  by
compiling  and  updating  lists  that  identify
vocational  schools  suitable  for  linking  to
Foxconn  internship  programs.  All  qualified
schools  were  required  to  participate  in
recruitment.
A government employment and social security office
converted into a Foxconn recruitment station at
Hongguang Town, Pi County (in Chengdu City,
Sichuan). Local states subsidize the growth of private
business with free hiring services and cheap labor
supply.
To assure the vocational schools' cooperation,
governments disburse funds to those that fulfill
company  targets  for  the  number  of  student
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interns. If schools fail to meet human resources
requirements,  education  bureaus  withhold
funds (Interview with a township government
official in Chengdu City, 17 December 2011).
Foxconn has taken advantage of this system to
extend  its  labor  recruitment  networks  to
schools,  where it  draws on the assistance of
local  officials  and teachers  to  utilize  student
labor. Figure 3 shows how Foxconn in Sichuan
province  draws  up  plans  for  student  labor
recruitment, then top-level government officials
lead work teams across different administrative
levels  (city,  county,  district,  township  and
village) to meet the deadlines and quotas, with
the cooperation of the vocational schools under
their jurisdiction.
Foxconn internship recruitment through local
mobilization, Sichuan. For illustrative purposes, we
simplify the complex, multi-level power relationships
in the recruitment of student interns through the
triple alliance of Foxconn, local governments (from
the provincial to the village level), and vocational
schools (under the jurisdiction of Sichuan province).
The seven vocational schools that we specify were
publicly reported in local news and/or on school
websites as participating in the Foxconn internship
programs. Source: Field data collected in Sichuan
province.
All  production  workers,  including  student
interns,  at  Foxconn Chengdu are engaged in
making iPads  exclusively  for  Apple.  Between
September 2011 and January 2012 (a school
semester),  in  Foxconn's  Chengdu  factories,
more  than  7,000  students-approximately  ten
percent of the labor force-were working on the
assembly  line  (Interviews  with  human
resources managers and teachers in December
2011  and  January  2012) .  One  o f  the
participating  schools,  Pujiang  Vocational
School,  sent  162  students  on  22  September
2011 to undertake three-month internships that
were subjected to extension in accordance with
iPad  production  needs.  The  large  Pengzhou
Technical  School  signed  up  309  students,
accompanied by three male and three female
teachers during the entire internship. This is
typical  of  the  1:50  teacher-student  ratio
maintained throughout the Foxconn Chengdu
internship program in 2011-2012. Contrary to
our  findings,  the  Apple-commissioned factory
inspector  Fair  Labor  Association  "found  no
interns  had  been  engaged  at  [Foxconn]
Chengdu  since  September  2011"  (our
emphasis) (Fair Labor Association 2013, 5).7
A recruitment poster introducing the corporate
background of Foxconn (Chengdu) is displayed
outside the Chengdu rail station, Sichuan. Since
October 2010 Foxconn (Chengdu) has produced iPads
exclusively for Apple. In one semester during
2011-2012, it employed more than 7,000 "student
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interns" on the assembly line.
Government  officials  support  the  timely
fulfillment of labor recruitment assignments for
Foxconn  by  doing  public  relations  work  to
improve  the  company's  image.  The  targets
include  students  and  fresh  graduates.  A
township  official-in-charge  elaborated,  "We
were  tasked  by  upper  level  governments  to
eliminate  negative  social  attitudes  toward
Foxconn  after  the  [2010]  suicide  wave"8
(Interview on 14 December 2011).  The main
contents  of  student  labor  recruitment  are
Foxconn's corporate development, its economic
and technological strength, and its expansion
prospects.  The  government  team  deploys
messages "across the internet, radio, television,
posters,  blogposts,  leaflets,  telephone  calls,
door-to-door  visits,  and the mail  to  publicize
Foxconn's  culture,  and  guide  recruitment
targets in correct thinking and understanding"
(The People's Government of Guangyuan City
[Sichuan] 2011a). Villages, towns, and schools
are saturated with propaganda to assure that
Foxconn  achieves  the  status  of  a  household
name. The division of labor is summarized as
follows (Interview with a township government
official in Chengdu City, 16 December 2011):
1.  The  Human  Resources  and
Social Security Department makes
recruitment a top priority.
2.  The  Education  Department
arranges  schoo l -bus iness
cooperation,  ensures  that  the
number of  graduates  and interns
meets  the  assigned  goal,  and
arranges  for  their  transportation
on  schedu le  and  p roper l y
supervised  by  teachers.
3.  The  Finance  Department
ensures  that  recruitment  is
adequately  funded.
4. The Public Security Department
completes  job  app l icants '
background  investigations.
5. The Transportation Department
assures  appropriate  transport
capacity  and  safety.
6. The Health Department provides
pre -emp loyment  phys i ca l
examinations.
7.  Other  relevant  departments
ensure that recruitment progresses
smoothly.
Foxconn  obtains  wealth  of  resources  from
multiple government departments to enhance
its cost-competitiveness and business capacity
while assuring an abundant supply of workers
at a time of tightened labor markets. Indeed, in
the past 30-plus years, preferential treatment
by  local  governments  has  increased  capital
mobility  and  facilitated  the  growth  of
transnational  corporations,  first  in  southeast
coastal  regions  and  then  in  interior  cities
(McNally 2004; Leng 2005; Selden and Perry
2010).  What  is  new  is  the  outreach  to
vocational schools to tap student labor through
a  partnership  of  capital  and  state.  One
municipal  government  actually  conducts
investigations  of  departments  that  "do  not
complete 50 percent of monthly tasks," pushing
for  a  100  percent  completion  rate  of  the
recruitment  quota  handed  down  by  Foxconn
(The People's Government of Guangyuan City
[Sichuan] 2011b).
"In  Chengdu,"  Andrew  Ross  (2006,  218)
concludes  from  his  research  on  global  IT
service  outsourcing  to  China  that  "it  was
impossible not to come across evidence of the
state's  hand  in  the  fostering  of  high-tech
industry."  From  Sichuan  to  central  China's
Henan province, provincial governments have
s imi lar l y  channe l led  f inanc ia l  and
administrative  resources  to  support  Foxconn
 APJ | JF 13 | 36 | 2
14
hiring.  In  June  2010,  the  Zhengzhou  City
Education  Bureau  directed  all  vocational
schools  under  its  jurisdiction  to  dispatch
students  1,000  miles  away  to  Foxconn's
Shenzhen  factories  for  employment  and/or
internships. This step was taken to make sure
students would complete their training in time
for the August opening of a new manufacturing
base in Zhengzhou, provincial capital of Henan.
Foxconn  Zhengzhou  exclusively  assembles
iPhones for Apple. The opening passage of the
government notification to all education units
reads  (Zhengzhou  City  Education  Bureau
(Henan)  2010):
To  promote  the  city's  vocational  education,
acce lera te  the  pace  o f  educat iona l
development,  deepen  school-business
cooperation,  strengthen  customized  training,
and promote industry, it has been decided to
launch an employment (internship) partnership
with  Foxconn  Technology  Group,  and  to
arrange for  all  vocational  school  students  to
work (intern) at Foxconn Shenzhen.
Specifics of the sweeteners offered to Foxconn
include the following (Henan Provincial Poverty
Alleviation Office 2010.):
1.  Implementing  a  pol icy  of
rewards  for  job  introductions  at
the standard rate of 200 yuan per
person  from  the  designated
government employment fund.
2. Giving every successful worker
(or intern) a 600-yuan subsidy from
the  designated  government
employment  fund.
The  Henan  provincial  government,  using
taxpayers'  money,  pays  for  incentives  to
schools or labor agencies ("the job introduction
fee"  of  200  yuan/person)  that  arrange  for
employment and/or internships at Foxconn. In
August and September 2010, local government
officials divided the 20,000-recruit goal among
23 counties and cities (each new worker/intern
receives  600  yuan).  For  the  targeted
recruitment of 20,000 persons, the government
bill  would  be  16,000,000  yuan  (=  20,000
persons  ×  (200  +  600)  yuan).  Each  city  or
county  government  was  assigned  specific
recruitment  targets,  with  quotas  within  each
district subdivided down to villages and towns.
Table  1  shows  the  number  of  new Foxconn
recruits  that  each  of  the  23  localities  was
ordered to produce. From this moment, student
internships  were  transformed  into  a
government-organized activity in the service of
a private employer (see also, Henan Provincial
Education Department 2010).
Government  Recruitment










1 Xinyang 1,000 1,000 2,000
2 Zhoukou 940 940 1,880
3 Luoyang 850 900 1,750
4 Nanyang 850 850 1,700
5 Shangqiu 850 850 1,700
6 Zhumadian 850 850 1,700
7 Puyang 750 700 1,450
8 Xinxiang 680 680 1,360
9 Anyang 650 650 1,300
10 Pingdingshan 550 550 1,100
11 Kaifeng 500 500 1,000
12 Zhengzhou 200 200 400
13 Hebi 200 200 400
14 Jiaozuo 200 200 400
15 Xuchang 200 200 400
16 Luohe 200 200 400
17 Sanmenxia 200 200 400
18 Gushi County, Xinxiang 100 100 200
19 Jiyuan 50 50 100
20 Dengzhou City, Nanyang 50 50 100
21 Yongcheng City, Shangqiu 50 50 100
22 Xiangcheng City, Zhoukou 50 50 100
23 Gongyi City, Zhengzhou 30 30 60
 Total 10,000 10,000 20,000
Th e  H e n a n  p r o v i n c i a l
government  established  an
inter-departmental  committee
to coordinate labor recruitment
at  Foxconn.  The  20,000  new
recruits included students and
non-student job seekers.
Source:  Henan Provincial  Poverty
Alleviation Office 2010.
Student  interns-cheap,  youthful,  and
productive-are a  new source of  labor that  is
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growing larger in step with the expansion of
vocational education. Steven McKay in Satanic
Mills  or  Silicon  Islands  concludes  that  high-
tech commodity  producers  "focus  their  labor
concerns  on  cost,  availability,  quality,  and
controllability" to enhance profitability (2006,
42, italics original). On 1 November 2011, Han
Chinese and Tibetan student interns got into a
brawl  during  working  hours.  The  incident
sounded an alarm and a vice principal from one
of the participating vocational schools arrived
on the scene the next day to "look after his
students," reported interviewee Teacher Jiang.
He added, "All of the few dozen students were
laid  off.  Foxconn demanded that  the schools
concerned  immediately  'take  back  the  bad
students'  to  prevent  any disruption to  work"
(Interview  on  15  December  2011).  The
assistance of the vice principal in removing the
interns  to  whom  Foxconn  objected  reveals
other dimensions of how the schools and the
enterprise cooperate in exercising dual control
over  students  (Smith  and  Chan  2015).
Psychosocial behaviour, such as playing video
games all night and not going to work on time,
as  well  as  slowing  down  due  to  loss  of
motivation to work hard, however, continued.
Foxconn's presentation of Outstanding Student
Intern Awards-also known as the "hardworking
bee" prize-failed to instill stronger commitment
and loyalty among interns who perceived the
internship as squandering their education and
found the work demeaning.
None of the 38 interviewed interns expressed
interest  in  working  for  Foxconn  after
graduation. If they were interested in assembly
line  jobs,  they  would  have  started  working
straight  away  after  finishing  middle  school
rather  than  seeking  specialized  training  in
multiple fields. "Come on, what do you think
we've learned standing for more than ten hours
a  day  manning  the  machines  on  the  line?
What's  an  internship?  There's  no  relation  to
what we study in school. Every day is just a
repetition of one or two simple motions, like a
robot,"  Lintong emphasized (Interview on 29
November 2011).
IV. Conclusion
If  the  Chinese  government's  goal  is  to
encourage  workforce  preparedness  by
investing in  vocational  training,  with  student
internships as a core component, the policy is a
failure. Foxconn has shifted hiring costs onto
local governments and outsourced recruitment
to vocational schools to obtain a flexible, low-
cost  labor  supply.  In  this  capital-state-school
alliance, the incorporation of students into the
workplace  in  the  guise  of  internships  has
served the interests of capital, while generating
intern  protests  over  unfair  and  illegal
treatment.9  Intense  competition  among
localities  to  lure  foreign  investment  has
undermined  enforcement  of  labor  and
educational  laws.  Notwithstanding  significant
Chinese legal reforms to date, there remains a
deep-seated conflict between state legitimation
and  local  accumulation,  with  the  result  that
student  workers'  rights  and  interests  are
sacrificed. Companies have continued to exploit
the  internal  contradictions  of  the  state  to
maximize  their  gains,  and  local  states  have
bent education and labor rules and regulations
to  attract  businesses.  This  is  one  important
facet of China's distinctive state capitalism.
Speaking  of  the  dynamism  of  state-society
relations,  Ching  Kwan  Lee  (2007,  17)  "sees
contradictions  within  different  state
imperatives and insists that state power is not
independent of but rather constituted through
its  engagement  with  social  groups  in  their
acquiescence  and  activism,  triggered  by
contradictory  state  goals  and  policies."  We
observe that, under mounting public concerns
of student worker abuses, including child labor
hidden  in  the  guise  of  interns  at  Foxconn's
labor-hungry  factories  (SACOM  2012),  the
Chinese  central  government  has  recently
proposed new "Draft Rules on the Management
of  Vocational  School  Student  Internships"
(Ministry of Education of the People's Republic
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of  China  2012).  These  rules,  if  vigorously
implemented,  would  require  that  student
internships  have  substantial  educational
content  and  work-skill  training  plans,  along
with  comprehensive  labor  protections  for
teenage  workers.  As  of  December  2014,
however,  the  draft  rules  still  had  not  been
issued (Ministry of  Education of  the People's
Republic of China 2014), suggesting opposition
from employers and their allies.
At the industry level, in an attempt to polish its
corporate image, Apple (2013, 19) reiterated in
January 2013 its standards for suppliers' hiring
of  students:  "Student  working  hours  must
comply with legal restrictions.... We've begun
to partner with industry consultants to help our
suppliers  improve  their  policies,  procedures,
and management of internship programs to go
beyond  what  the  law  requires."  Claiming  to
exercise  corporate  social  responsibility  in
global supply-chain management, Apple never
acknowledged its own culpability in imposing
tight  delivery  schedules  and  high  quality
demands at the lowest possible prices (Chan et
al .  2013,  2015;  Chakrabortty  2013).
Manufacturers,  faced  with  buyers'  tight
deadlines and ruthless demands, in turn place
tremendous  pressure  on  frontline  workers
including interns to retain contracts and stay
profitable. In February 2014, Scott Rozelle, co-
director of the Rural Education Action Program
at Stanford University, announced a monitoring
and evaluation program of student internships
at  the  invitation  of  Apple  in  Apple's  China-
based major suppliers (Rural Education Action
Program 2014).  As  of  our  writing  in  August
2015,  the  findings  were  still  not  publicly
available.
Ross  Perlin  in  his  book  on  American  and
European internship practices,  Intern Nation,
comments, "The very significance of the word
intern lies in its ambiguity" (2011, 23, italics
original).  In  the  four  years  we  have  been
working on this research, we have seen that
the  recruitment  of  interns  as  cheap  and
disposable  labor  at  Foxconn  has  become
routine practice that continues in the present
day, and extends to many other companies such
as Samsung and Lenovo (see also China Labor
Watch  2014;  Dou  2014).  Schools,  facing
financial and political pressure, are unable to
shield  students  from internships  that  violate
the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  law.  Business-
friendly  local  authorities  sponsor  such
internship  programs through direct  subsidies
and  administrat ive  support  to  large
corporations.  In  China,  the  student  labor
regime  has  become integral  to  its  economic
development, frequently at the sacrifice of all
workers' interests.
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Notes
1  Concerning  the  rights  protection  of  China-
based  student  interns  in  transnational
production,  on 16 December 2013, we wrote
letters to, respectively, Foxconn CEO Terry Gou
and Apple CEO Tim Cook. Apple is the world's
most  profitable  technology  company,  which
contracts  Foxconn,  among  others,  to
manufacture  its  branded  products.  The  two
letters,  and company statements,  are  on  file
with the authors.
2  On  the  inherent  contradictions  between
legitimacy and profitability in global capitalism,
and the varied responses of industrial capital
and the state under specific historical context,
see  also  Burawoy  (1985),  Silver  (2003),  and
Webster et al. (2008).
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3  The  names  of  our  interviewees,  unless
otherwise  specified,  are  changed  to  protect
them.
4 Law of the People's Republic of China on the
Protection  of  Minors  (Zhonghua  Renmin
Gongheguo Wei Chengnianren Baohu Fa 2013)
protects  young  people  under  18  for  their
balanced  development  and  healthy  growth.
Article  20  stipulates  that  schools,  including
vocational  schools,  shall  "cooperate  with  the
parents  or  other  guardians  of  the  minor
students to guarantee the minor students time
for sleeping, recreational activities and physical
exercises and may not increase their burden of
study."
5 As of December 2013, in Shenzhen, Foxconn
paid ten percent of employees' basic monthly
wage for social insurance (180 yuan) and five
percent for the mandatory housing provident
fund (90 yuan), that is, 270 yuan/month in total.
6  Th e  S o n g  o f  t h e  V o l g a  B o a tmen
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZlABtBm6V
5o) (in Russian with Chinese illustration)
7  The  Fair  Labor  Association  (FLA)  received
from Apple membership dues of US$250,000,
plus audit fees for conducting its investigation
at  Foxconn Chengdu and two other Foxconn
factories in Shenzhen (Longhua and Guanlan)
between 2011 and 2012 (Weir 2012). Given the
complete financial dependence of the FLA on
the companies that support it, we question its
ability to fulfill its purported mission to protect
workers in the global economy.
8 In 2010, at least 18 workers attempted suicide
at Foxconn's facilities in Shenzhen and other
cities, resulting in 14 deaths and four crippling
injuries,  see Chan and Pun (2010) and Chan
(2013).
9  I t  was  es t imated  that  in  May  2010
approximately 70 percent of the 1,800 workers
were student interns at  a Honda parts plant
based  in  Nanhai  District  in  Foshan  City,
Guangdong. Following a significant victory in
which Honda workers  received an additional
500 yuan per month and underpaid interns over
600  yuan  more  per  month,  auto  workers  at
supplier factories of Toyota and Hyundai were
emboldened to take their demands to managers
(see Butollo and ten Brink 2012; Chan and Hui
2014; Friedman 2014, chap. 5; Lyddon et al.
2015).
